Yan Thomas, Jacques Chiffoleau, L’istituzione della natura by Montebugnoli, Anna
 
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas 
17 | 2020
Varia










Anna Montebugnoli, « Yan Thomas, Jacques Chiffoleau, L’istituzione della natura », Journal of
Interdisciplinary History of Ideas [Online], 17 | 2020, Online since 12 August 2020, connection on 12
October 2020. URL : http://journals.openedition.org/jihi/1206 
This text was automatically generated on 12 October 2020.
Creative Commons Attribution-ShareAlike 4.0 International Public License




Yan Thomas, Jacques Chiffoleau, L’istituzione della natura, translated and edited by
Michele Spanò, Quodlibet, Macerata, 2020, p.128. ISBN 9788822904843, €  15,00.
Yan Thomas, Jacques Chiffoleau, L’istituzione della natura
Journal of Interdisciplinary History of Ideas, 17 | 2020
1
1 At  the  beginning  of  Woody  Allen’s  Love
and Death, just before being executed, the
protagonist  remembers  his  boyhood  at
the  summer  house  where,  among  many
other  characters,  were  “Old  Gregor  and
his  son  Young  Gregor.  Oddly  enough,
Young Gregor was older than Old Gregor.
Nobody  could  figure  out  how  that
happened”.  Such  an  inversion,  which
belongs in the first place to the sphere of
logic  and  its  paradoxes,  represents,  if
transferred in the context of the history
of  law  and  of  its  use  of  the  concept  of
nature,  a  most  subversive  statement.  In
fact,  the  impossibility  for  a  father  to  be
younger than his own son is the clearest
example,  as  well  as  the  main  refrain
running  throughout  the  legal  history  of
the concept, asserting the normative and
institutional  power  of  nature,  and
therefore  setting  the  boundaries  to  the
artifices of law since the age of the Roman
leges and ius and throughout the medieval configuration of the ius naturale: “Minorem
natu  majorem  non  posse  adoptare  placet.  Adoptio  enim  naturam  imitatur:  et  pro
monstro est, ut major sit filius, quam pater” (Institutiones, 1, 11, 4).
2 However, beneath the continuity of this formula—as of many others—the study of its
conceptual modifications and, even more, of its technical applications makes it possible
to glimpse the shifts of the legal formulations and uses of ‘nature’. The critical inquiry
into such shifts is the focus and the fil rouge of the essays collected in L’istituzione della
natura,  which  analyse,  at  different  points  in  history,  the  mechanisms  of  its
institutionalization, while following at the same time its progressive and concurrent
‘naturalization’. The book is in fact an assemblage of three texts: Yan Thomas’s “Imago
naturae. Nota sull’istituzionalità della natura a Roma”, on the fictional legal status of
Roman nature (it is the translation of Thomas 1991); Jacques Chiffoleau’s “Contra natura.
Per un approccio casuistico e procedurale alla natura medievale”, on the links between
the medieval Christianised natura, God’s voluntas and the theory of majesty (originally
published as Chiffoleau 1996); and Spanò’s afterword “«Perché non rendi poi quel che
prometti allor?». Tecniche e ideologie della giuridificazione della natura”, on the limits
of  the  modern  process  of  subjectivation  as  applied  to  nature  in  the  context  of
environmental legal actions. The collection, while discussing the notion of nature and,
moreover, its practical applications within the framework of case-law history, draws a
diachronic line of critical investigation that challenges both the legal historical and
philosophical assumptions on nature, and its contemporary understanding and uses.
What results from this collective archaeological inquiry is a peculiar image of nature
emerging  from  the  analysis  of  the  subtle  deviations  of  its  legal  formulations  and
purposes.
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3 Thomas’s inquiry allows for the identification of the metaphysical and moral status of
Roman nature as the ‘by-product’ of the (linguistic and rhetorical) artifices and devices
through which the law grasps and shapes the ‘things’ of the world. In the context of
Roman  law,  reconstructed  in  its  historical  complexity  through  a  meticulous  case
analysis,  nature  exists  as  “an  image  of  the  institutions”  (35),  which  produce  it  as
something existing outside of their domain in order to strengthen their institutional
hold on facts and reality. That is to say, to return to the previous example, the nature
forbidding the son to be older than the father, which the law imitates, is created as
such by that same law that claims to be shaped according to its example. Roman law, in
fact,  summons  nature  so  as  to  set  its  own  boundaries,  which  ensure  its  legal
effectiveness and, in so doing, ‘artificially’ produces the figure of natura as an entirely
“institutionalised and legal” one (44).
4 Chiffoleau’s critical analysis, in turn, makes it possible to spot the peculiar dialectic
among nature’s metaphysical normativity (which results from the Christian interlacing
of the ancient philosophical concept with its Roman legal form), its role in the shaping
of the medieval concept of majestas (78-79), and the modern configuration of power
(98-101). The acts contra naturam discussed by Chiffoleau are indeed defined against the
background of a nature which is identified with God’s Will,  whose order shapes the
phenomenal  world,  and  at  the  same  time  work  as  the  instruments  measuring  the
extent  of  the  “institutional”  effects  of  the  equivalence  among  nature,  divina
omnipotentia, and majesty. Thus, the impossibility for a son to be older than the father is
now prescribed by a law of nature which precedes human law, rather than descending
from the latter—as in the case of Roman law. At the same time, the acta contra naturam
are  defined  as  such  (that  is,  they  come  to  be  into  the language  despite  their
“unspeakable” nature) by prosecuting institutions, which in turn establish their power
by virtue of that same defining ability.
5 Finally, Spanò’s inquiry into the contemporary notion of nature, carried out in light of
its  inextricable  connection  to  the  ecological  question,  aims  at  a  radical  critique  of
subjective law. In fact, once again, the analysis of legal techniques and practices makes
it possible, by virtue of the dialogue with Thomas’s and Chiffoleau’s essays, both to
recognise the metaphysical normative tradition working behind the contemporary use
of  the  concept  of  nature,  and  the  inherent  limits,  resulting  from  this  concealed
premise, of the dichotomy between subjects and things which informs contemporary
legal environmental struggles. The attempts at personifying nature in order to defend
its  ‘rights’  end up reproducing a  radical  ontological  separation between things and
individuals, which rests upon the idea of a reality (metaphysically and morally) pre-
existing to the artificial world of law, thus somehow orienting its actions. Within this
framework, the only weapon of subjective law seems to be its ability to allow for the
transition  from  one  ontological  plane  to  the  other:  a  lake,  a  tree,  a  forest  are
transferred  from  the  realm  of  things  to  that  of  subjects  (119).  Such  a  transition,
however,  not  only  reaffirms  the  same  metaphysical  dichotomy  that  structures  the
anthropocentrism deeply linked to the environmental crisis, in so far as it assumes that
rights belong only to persons and subjects—and that consequently language is a matter
of persons and subjects rather than things; it  also automatically implies a vicarious
subject able to speak for the ‘personified’ and yet silent things of nature (117).
6 However, the circle between the ontological difference of objects and subjects, which is
implied and affirmed by subjective law, and the inefficacy of the legal personification of
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nature  can  be  broken  by  the  peculiar  imago  naturae emerging  from  Thomas’s  and
Chiffolau’s  analyses.  In  fact, as  Spanò  argues,  “the  legal  existence  of a  ‘nature’
uncompromised by metaphysical arguments is one of the most extraordinary formal
intuitions of Roman civil law” (109). At the same time, its medieval multiple uses in
different fields and for various functions enlighten the ‘plasticity’ of the concept, that
is, its willingness to be shaped over and over again, and to serve different purposes at
the same time. From this double perspective – that of its institutionalised existence and
of its plasticity – nature becomes the main expression of the artificial and linguistic
power of the law to ‘manipulate’ the distribution among objects, facts, and subjects that
the metaphysical viewpoint made appear absolutely fixed. Thus, a whole new kind of
‘things’  emerge:  assemblages and collectives constituted by heterogeneous elements
that do not result in a new unity (subject to personification or reification) but that, on
the contrary, put in motion a multiplicity of singularities outlining new figures and
opening  up  new legal  possibilities.  In  light  of  this,  the  legal  environmental  debate
should not be about nature and natural objects but, rather, about “ecosystems, that is, a
certain kind of relations among beings localised in spaces of various extension; put
another way, vital environments, whatever their nature may be” (119).
7 The point therefore is  not simply to put aside the concept of  nature.  In fact,  what
emerges from the reading of  this  collection is  how its  normative and metaphysical
implications  are  structured  by  its  artificial  character.  That  is,  nature  itself,  and
therefore  the  ontological  paradigm  it  establishes,  are  the  product  of  the  intrinsic
fictional  quality  of  law.  They result  from the fictio  legis which represents the inner
mechanism through which the ius uses language in order to both affirm its indifference
toward any ontological truth, and to shape the very same order of reality and facts
(Thomas 2016).
8 Interestingly enough, the same ambivalence of nature can be observed also from other
disciplinary perspectives. More precisely, it can be observed in all those cases where
the  intersection  between  the  manipulative  power  of  language  and  technique  over
reality and facts is more evident. Particularly relevant in this regard is the case of the
history of art,  in so far as it  allows for the recognition of practises and techniques
which are similar to the artifices of law, and which, moreover, interact with them in
unexpected ways. I shall limit myself to a few examples. The fictional character that
Roman art inherited from the Hellenistic tradition is well known, as well as its radical
indifference toward any mimetic effort to reproduce natural truth (see Guastini 2003).
Among the many instances of Roman artistic illusions, the case of the asarotos oikos or
“unswept room”, an artistic device first employed at Pergamon during the 2nd century
B.C.  and  which  became  popular  among  roman  élites,  is  particularly  revealing.  It
consisted of floor mosaics reproducing food scraps that served the purpose to hide, by
virtue of the technique of the trompe l’œil, the food waste thrown on the ground during
the banquets (Dunbabin 1999, 26-27). Such an artistic ‘trick’ well illustrates the same
indifference  toward  the  ontological  issue  of  truth  and falseness  which  informs the
principle  of  fictio  legis.  It  is  in  fact  precisely  on  the  basis  of  the  “certainty  of  the
falseness”1,  which lays beneath the institutionalised nature emerging from Thomas’s
essay, that this fiction can bring together different ontological planes without any care
for the distinction (so fundamental for the Greek philosophical tradition) between the
‘scraps’ of nature and their illusionistic reproductions. The illusions of the asarotos oikos
work particularly well as an example of the metaphysical Roman laicity, in so far as it
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presupposes  the  confusion  and  the  “contact”  between  ontologically  heterogenous
‘things’ which the surface, rather than separate, articulates.
9 If this Roman case works mostly as an analogy between art and law, that is, between
the fictional legal language and the artifices of artistic techniques, the link between
law, nature,  language and artistic  fiction becomes cogent in the case of  Bernard of
Clairvaux’s critique of Romanesque art. In the context of the monastic diatribe which
characterised the first  half of  12th century,  Bernard’s  Apologia outlines,  through his
argument against the deformed and monstrous creatures adorning monastic cloisters,
a  principle  of  equivalence  between  the  law  of  God,  the  rhetorical  rules  laying
underneath monastic  reading (Carruthers  1998,  81-87),  and the  division among the
realms of nature:
In the cloisters, before the eyes of the brothers while they read [coram legentibus
fratribus]—what is that ridiculous monstrosity doing, an amazing kind of deformed
beauty and yet a beautiful deformity? […]. You may see many bodies under one
head, and conversely many heads on one body […]. In short, everywhere so plentiful
and astonishing a variety of contradictory forms is seen that one would rather read
in the marble  than in books [magis legere libeat in marmoribus, quam in codicibus], and
spend the whole day wondering at every single one of them than in meditating on
the law of God [in lege Dei meditando] (Bernard, Apologia, 12.29, 283).
10 In  the  eyes  of  Bernard,  the  main  fault  of  Romanesque  grotesques  is  that  their
monstrous images,  in so far as they transit  from one form to the other and create
hybrids figures, alter, along the line of the fictional power of language and art,  the
order of nature (Rudolph 1990, 119-124). Its law is presented here, as in the 12th century
sources analysed by Chiffoleau, as one and the same with that of God, which is studied
by the monks during their readings in the cloisters, and which should be mirrored, in
its ontological order, by any visual reproduction. In this context, nature is therefore at
once the phenomenal representation of the metaphysical partition ordered by the law
of God, and the imago of  its subversive (“contra”) rearrangement resulting from the
artifices and fictions of rhetoric and art.
11 As for modernity, at the point of transition from the Renaissance world, shaped by the
newly  discovered  philosophical  and  literary  Greek  tradition,  to  the  cultural
hodgepodge—from which the modern subject of subjective law will emerge—stands, as
an example of the ambiguity of the modern image of nature, the art of Arcimboldo. In
his Composed Heads representing the seasons, he plays with the boundaries between the
order of natural continuity and contiguity, the rhetorical compositional implications of
art’s fiction, and its metaphysical subversiveness. As Roland Barthes wrote:
If you look at the image close up, you see only fruits and vegetables; if you step
back, you no longer see anything but a man with a terrible eye, a ribbed doublet, a
bristling ruff (Summer): distance and proximity are promoters of meaning. Is this
not the great secret of every vital semantics? Everything proceeds from a spacing
out or staggering of articulations. […] What has been combined forms aggregates
which can combine again among themselves a second, a third time. I imagine that
an ingenious artist could take all of Arcimboldo’s composite heads, combine them
with a view to a new effect of meaning, and form their arrangement procedure, for
instance, a landscape, a city, a forest (Barthes 1991, 141-142).
12 An ingenious artist, that is to say, would be able to use the instruments of rhetorical
and artistic fiction in order to form ‘ecosystems’ which result from the recombination
of the ‘things’ of nature—things that, by virtue of this “mobile painting” (Barthes 1991,
142), are no longer things but assemblages of singular parts, along the line of linguistic
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and artistic  artifices.  The  “odd mathematics”  outlined by  the  composition of  these
parts (Barthes 1991, 141) brings us back to the legal “tertium” of the assemblages of
singularities that do not add up in a new unity of things or individuals (122). These
realities,  deriving  from  the  composition  of  ‘pieces’  of  reality,  which  reshapes  the
ontological order of nature, hint at something as a mobile mereology that, along with
the fictions of language, art, rhetorics, etc., seems to allow for a radical rethinking of
the same metaphysical immobility which has informed such an important part of the
history of the concept of nature.
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NOTES
1. This formula can be found at the beginning of another essay by Thomas (2016).
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